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Court Opinions ›› Arizona v. Evans (1995)
ARIZONA, PETITIONER v. ISAAC EVANS
No. 93-1660 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 514 U.S. 1; 115 S. Ct. 1185; 131 L. Ed. 2d 34; 1995 U.S. LEXIS 1806; 63 U.S.L.W. 4179; 95 Cal. Daily Op. Service 1509; 95 Daily Journal DAR 2671 December 7, 1994, Argued March 1, 1995, Decided PRIOR HISTORY: ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA. Respondent was arrested by Phoenix police during a routine traffic stop when a patrol car's computer indicated that there was an outstanding misdemeanor warrant for his arrest. A subsequent search of his car revealed a bag of marijuana, and he was charged with possession. Respondent moved to suppress the marijuana as the fruit of an unlawful arrest, since the misdemeanor warrant had been quashed before his arrest. The trial court granted the motion, but the Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that the exclusionary rule's purpose would not be served by excluding evidence obtained because of an error by employees not directly associated with the arresting officers or their police department. In reversing, the Arizona Supreme Court rejected the distinction between clerical errors committed by law enforcement personnel and similar mistakes by court employees and predicted that the exclusionary rule's application would serve to improve the efficiency of criminal justice system recordkeepers.
The exclusionary rule does not require suppression of evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment where the erroneous information resulted from clerical errors of court employees.
The offense to the dignity of the citizen who is arrested, handcuffed, and searched on a public street simply because some bureaucrat has failed to maintain an accurate computer data base strikes me as equally outrageous. In this case, of course, such an error led to the fortuitous detection of respondent's unlawful possession of marijuana, and the suppression of the fruit of the error would prevent the prosecution of his crime. That cost, however, must be weighed against the interest in protecting other, wholly innocent citizens from unwarranted indignity.
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