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Court Opinions ›› Minnesota v. Carter (1998)
MINNESOTA, PETITIONER v. WAYNE THOMAS CARTER
No. 97-1147 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 525 U.S. 83; 119 S. Ct. 469; 142 L. Ed. 2d 373; 1998 U.S. LEXIS 7844; 67 U.S.L.W. 4017; 98 Cal. Daily Op. Service 8754; 98 Daily Journal DAR 12129; 1998 Colo. J. C.A.R. 5991 October 6, 1998, Argued December 1, 1998, Decided SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: As Amended October 21, 1999. PRIOR HISTORY: MINNESOTA V. MELVIN JOHNS ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF MINNESOTA. A police officer looked in an apartment window through a gap in the closed blind and observed respondents Carter and Johns and the apartment's lessee bagging cocaine. After respondents were arrested, they moved to suppress, inter alia, cocaine and other evidence obtained from the apartment and their car, arguing that the officer's initial observation was an unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Respondents were convicted of state drug offenses. The Minnesota trial court held that since they were not overnight social guests, they were not entitled to Fourth Amendment protection, and that the officer's observation was not a search under the Amendment. The State Court of Appeals held that Carter did not have "standing" to object to the officer's actions because the evidence indicated that he used the apartment for a business purpose -- to package drugs -- and, separately, affirmed Johns' conviction without addressing the "standing" issue. In reversing, the State Supreme Court held that respondents had "standing" to claim Fourth Amendment protection because they had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place, and that the officer's observation constituted an unreasonable search.
Any search that may have occurred did not violate respondents' Fourth Amendment rights. [...] Rather, to claim Fourth Amendment protection, a defendant must demonstrate that he personally has an expectation of privacy in the place searched, and that his expectation is reasonable. [...] While an overnight guest may have a legitimate expectation of privacy in someone else's home, see Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 98-99, 109 L. Ed. 2d 85, 110 S. Ct. 1684, one who is merely present with the consent of the householder may not, see Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 259, 4 L. Ed. 2d 697, 80 S. Ct. 725. And an expectation of privacy in commercial property is different from, and less than, a similar expectation in a home. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 700, 96 L. Ed. 2d 601, 107 S. Ct. 2636. Here, the purely commercial nature of the transaction, the relatively short period of time that respondents were on the premises, and the lack of any previous connection between them and the householder all lead to the conclusion that their situation is closer to that of one simply permitted on the premises. Any search which may have occurred did not violate their Fourth Amendment rights. Because respondents had no legitimate expectation of privacy, the Court need not decide whether the officer's observation constituted a "search."
...the fuzzy standard of "legitimate expectation of privacy"...
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...[W]hereas it is plausible to regard a person's overnight lodging as at least his "temporary" residence, it is entirely impossible to give that characterization to an apartment that he uses to package cocaine. Respondents here were not searched in "their ... house" under any interpretation of the phrase that bears the remotest relationship to the well-understood meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
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A homedweller places her own privacy at risk, the Court's approach indicates, when she opens her home to others, uncertain whether the duration of their stay, their purpose, and their "acceptance into the household" will earn protection.
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The settled rule is [...] an expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576, 88 S. Ct. 507 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). The application of that rule involves consideration of the kind of place in which the individual claims the privacy interest and what expectations of privacy are traditional and well recognized.
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