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Court Opinions ›› Rutledge v. United States (1996)
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
RUTLEDGE v. UNITED STATES Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. No. 94-8769. Argued November 27, 1995 Decided March 27, 1996 A jury found petitioner guilty of one count of participating in a conspiracy to distribute controlled substances in violation of 21 U.S.C. Section(s) 846 and one count of conducting a continuing criminal enterprise (CCE) "in concert" with others in violation of Section(s) 848. The "in concert" element of his CCE offense was based on the same agreement as the Section(s) 846 conspiracy. The District Court entered judgment of conviction on both counts and imposed a sentence of life imprisonment without possible release on each, the sentences to be served concurrently. Pursuant to 18 U. S. C. Section(s) 3013, it also ordered petitioner to pay a special assessment of $50 on each count. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, relying on Jeffers v. United States, 432 U. S. 137, to reject petitioner's contention that his convictions and concurrent life sentences impermissibly punished him twice for the same offense.
The District Court erred in sentencing petitioner to concurrent life sentences on the Section(s) 846 and Section(s) 848 counts. (a) It is presumed that a legislature does not intend to impose two punishments where two statutory provisions proscribe the "same offense." The test for determining whether there are two offenses is whether each of the statutory provisions requires proof of a fact which the other does not. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U. S. 299, 304. This Court has often concluded that two statutes define the "same offense" where one is a lesser included offense of the other. [...] [T]he Court now resolves definitively that [...] [c]onspiracy is [...] a lesser included offense of CCE. [...] (d) The Government's argument that Congress intended to allow multiple convictions here to provide a "back up" conviction, preventing a defendant who later successfully challenges his greater offense from escaping punishment altogether, is unpersuasive. There is no reason why this particular pair of greater and lesser offenses should present any novel problem not already addressed by the federal appellate courts, which have uniformly concluded-with this Court's approval, see, e.g., Morris v. Mathews, 475 U. S. 237, 246-247 - that they may direct the entry of judgement for a lesser included offense when a conviction for a greater offense is reversed on grounds affecting only the greater offense.
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