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Court Opinions ›› Bourjaily v. United States (1987)
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 85-6725 1987.SCT.2891 , 483 U.S. 171, 107 S. Ct. 2775, 97 L. Ed. 2d 144, 55 U.S.L.W. 4962 June 23, 1987 BOURJAILY v. UNITED STATES CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT. In May 1984, Clarence Greathouse, an informant working for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), arranged to sell a kilogram of cocaine to Angelo Lonardo. Lonardo agreed that he would find individuals to distribute the drug. When the sale became imminent, Lonardo stated in a tape-recorded telephone conversation that he had a "gentleman friend" who had some questions to ask about the cocaine. In a subsequent telephone call, Greathouse spoke to the "friend" about the quality of the drug and the price. Greathouse then spoke again with Lonardo, and the two arranged the details of the purchase. They agreed that the sale would take place in a designated hotel parking lot, and Lonardo would transfer the drug from Greathouse's car to the "friend," who would be waiting in the parking lot in his own car. Greathouse proceeded with the transaction as planned, and FBI agents arrested Lonardo and petitioner immediately after Lonardo placed a kilogram of cocaine into petitioner's car in the hotel parking lot. In petitioner's car, the agents found over $20,000 in cash. At petitioner's trial that resulted in his conviction of federal drug charges, including a conspiracy charge, the Government introduced, over petitioner's objection, Lonardo's telephone statements regarding the "friend's" participation in the transaction. The District Court found that, considering both the events in the parking lot and Lonardo's statements, the Government had established by a preponderance of the evidence that a conspiracy involving Lonardo and petitioner existed, that Lonardo's statements were made in the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy, and that the statements thus satisfied Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E), which provides that a statement is not hearsay if it is made "by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy." The Court of Appeals affirmed, agreeing that Lonardo's statements were admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence, and also rejecting petitioner's contention that, because he could not cross-examine Lonardo (who exercised his right not to testify), admission of the statements violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him.
Lonardo's out-of-court statements were properly admitted against petitioner.
[T]he Court has, as a general matter only, required the prosecution to demonstrate both the unavailability of the declarant and the "indicia of reliability" surrounding the out-of-court declaration. Last Term in United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 (1986), we held that the first of these two generalized inquiries, unavailability, was not required when the hearsay statement is the out-of-court declaration of a co-conspirator. Today, we conclude that the second inquiry, independent indicia of reliability, is also not mandated by the Constitution. [...] Accordingly, we hold that the Confrontation Clause does not require a court to embark on an independent inquiry into the reliability of [co-conspirator] statements...
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...[A]ccording to the common-law view of the exemption of a co-conspirator's statement from the hearsay definition, an offering party was required to establish, as preliminary factual matters, the existence of a conspiracy and a defendant's participation therein by evidence apart from the co-conspirator's statement. [...] The Court's [...] argument in favor of abandonment of the independent-evidence rule might best be characterized as an attempt at pragmatic or "real world" analysis. The Court suggests that, while a co-conspirator's statement might be presumed unreliable when considered in isolation, it loses this unreliability when examined together with other evidence of the conspiracy and the defendant's participation in it.
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It is at least heartening, however, to see that the Court reserves the question whether a co-conspirator's statement alone, without any independent evidence, could establish the existence of a conspiracy and a defendant's participation in it. [...] If the statement alone could establish its own foundation for admissibility, a defendant could be convicted of conspiracy on the basis of an unsupported remark by an alleged conspirator...
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