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Court Opinions ›› Florida v. Luz Piedad Jimeno Et Al. (1991)
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 90-622 1991.SCT.2905 , 500 U.S. 248, 111 S. Ct. 1801, 114 L. Ed. 2d 297, 59 U.S.L.W. 4471 May 23, 1991 FLORIDA, PETITIONER v. LUZ PIEDAD JIMENO ET AL. CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA. Having stopped respondent Enio Jimeno's car for a traffic infraction, police officer Trujillo, who had been following the car after overhearing Jimeno arranging what appeared to be a drug transaction, declared that he had reason to believe that Jimeno was carrying narcotics in the car, and asked permission to search it. Jimeno consented, and Trujillo found cocaine inside a folded paper bag on the car's floorboard. Jimeno and a passenger, respondent Luz Jimeno, were charged with possession with intent to distribute cocaine in violation of Florida law, but the state trial court granted their motion to suppress the cocaine on the ground that Jimeno's consent to search the car did not carry with it specific consent to open the bag and examine its contents. The Florida District Court of Appeal and Supreme Court affirmed.
Whether a criminal suspect's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches is violated when, after he gives a police officer permission to search his automobile, the officer opens a closed container found within the car that might reasonably hold the object of the search.
A criminal suspect's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches is not violated when, after he gives police permission to search his car, they open a closed container found within the car that might reasonably hold the object of the search.
The [Fourth] Amendment is satisfied when, under the circumstances, it is objectively reasonable for the police to believe that the scope of the suspect's consent permitted them to open the particular container.
[...]
It is well established that an individual has but a limited expectation of privacy in the interior of his car. [...] In contrast, it is equally well established that an individual has a heightened expectation of privacy in the contents of a closed container. [...] Because an individual's expectation of privacy in a container is distinct from, and far greater than, his expectation of privacy in the interior of his car, it follows that an individual's consent to a search of the interior of his car cannot necessarily be understood as extending to containers in the car.
[...]
Almost 20 years ago [written in 1991], this Court held that an individual could validly "consent" to a search -- or, in other words, waive his right to be free from an otherwise unlawful search -- without being told that he had the right to withhold his consent. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973). In Schneckloth, as in this case, the Court cited the practical interests in efficacious law enforcement as the basis for not requiring the police to take meaningful steps to establish the basis of an individual's consent. I dissented in Schneckloth, and what I wrote in that case applies with equal force here.
"I must conclude, with some reluctance, that when the Court speaks of practicality, what it really is talking of is the continued ability of the police to capitalize on the ignorance of citizens so as to accomplish by subterfuge what they could not achieve by relying only on the knowing relinquishment of constitutional rights." [...]
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