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Asset Forfeitures Civil forfeiture laws allow the government to seize any property that is implicated in drug-related activities and then use the revenue to support law enforcement. (Usually the forfeited property gets appropriated by the same law enforcement agency that seized it.) Generally, the government can seize property and detain it pending trial on a mere "probable cause" standard, with the exception of real estate. The owner of the property needs not be found guilty before the property is seized. It's not even necessary that anyone be charged with a crime to forfeit property. This section of the site contains excerpts from various opinions that discuss asset forfeitures. Pages: ‹1› ‹2› ‹3› ‹4› ‹5› ‹6›
When it added subsection (a)(7) [providing for forfeiture of real property implicated in a drug-related crime] to § 881 in 1984, Congress recognized "that the traditional criminal sanctions of fine and imprisonment are inadequate to deter or punish the enormously profitable trade in dangerous drugs."
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[Regarding the argument that "the forfeited assets serve to compensate the Government for the expense of law enforcement activity and for its expenditure on societal problems such as urban blight, drug addiction, and other health concerns resulting from the drug trade"] We previously have upheld the forfeiture of goods involved in customs violations as "a reasonable form of liquidated damages." One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 237, 34 L. Ed. 2d 438, 93 S. Ct. 489 (1972). But the dramatic variations in the value of conveyances and real property forfeitable under §§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7) [drug crimes asset forfeiture statutes] undercut any similar argument with respect to those provisions. The Court made this very point in Ward: the "forfeiture of property . . . a penalty that has absolutely no correlation to any damages sustained by society or to the cost of enforcing the law." 448 U.S., at 254.
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JUSTICE SCALIA suggests that the sole measure of an in rem forfeiture's excessiveness is the relationship between the forfeited property and the offense. We do not rule out the possibility that the connection between the property and the offense may be relevant, but our decision today in no way limits the Court of Appeals from considering other factors in determining whether the forfeiture of Austin's property was excessive.
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Unlike monetary fines, statutory in rem forfeitures have traditionally been fixed, not by determining the appropriate value of the penalty in relation to the committed offense, but by determining what property has been "tainted" by unlawful use, to which issue the value of the property is irrelevant. Scales used to measure out unlawful drug sales, for example, are confiscable whether made of the purest gold or the basest metal. But an in rem forfeiture goes beyond the traditional limits that the Eighth Amendment permits if it applies to property that cannot properly be regarded as an instrumentality of the offense -- the building, for example, in which an isolated drug sale happens to occur. Such a confiscation would be an excessive fine. The question is not how much the confiscated property is worth, but whether the confiscated property has a close enough relationship to the offense.
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[21 U.S.C. §§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7)] statutes provide for the forfeiture of:
"(4) All conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles, or vessels, which are used, or are intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt, possession, or concealment of [controlled substances, their raw materials, and equipment used in their manufacture and distribution] "(7) All real property, including any right, title, and interest (including any leasehold interest) in the whole of any lot or tract of land and any appurtenances or improvements, which is used, or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission of, a violation of this subchapter punishable by more than one year's imprisonment . . . ." Each provision has an "innocent owner" exception. See §§ 881(a)(4)(C) and (a)(7). [...]
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