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Asset Forfeitures Civil forfeiture laws allow the government to seize any property that is implicated in drug-related activities and then use the revenue to support law enforcement. (Usually the forfeited property gets appropriated by the same law enforcement agency that seized it.) Generally, the government can seize property and detain it pending trial on a mere "probable cause" standard, with the exception of real estate. The owner of the property needs not be found guilty before the property is seized. It's not even necessary that anyone be charged with a crime to forfeit property. This section of the site contains excerpts from various opinions that discuss asset forfeitures.
Court Opinions on the Topic:
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit "reluctantly agreed with the government" [that a seemingly excessive civil forfeiture was constitutional] and affirmed. United States v. One Parcel of Property, 964 F.2d 814, 817 (1992). Although it thought that "the principle of proportionality should be applied in civil actions that result in harsh penalties," and that the Government was "exacting too high a penalty in relation to the offense committed," the court felt constrained from holding the forfeiture unconstitutional.
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[T]he question is not, as the United States would have it, whether forfeiture under §§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7) is civil or criminal, but rather whether it is punishment.
In considering this question, we are mindful of the fact that sanctions frequently serve more than one purpose. We need not exclude the possibility that a forfeiture serves remedial purposes to conclude that it is subject to the limitations of the Excessive Fines Clause. We, however, must determine that it can only be explained as serving in part to punish. [...] In sum, even though this Court has rejected the "innocence" of the owner as a common-law defense to forfeiture, it consistently has recognized that forfeiture serves, at least in part, to punish the owner. [...] We turn next to consider whether forfeitures under 21 U.S.C. §§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7) are properly considered punishment today. We find nothing in these provisions or their legislative history to contradict the historical understanding of forfeiture as punishment. [...]
The fiction "that the thing is primarily considered the offender," Goldsmith-Grant Co., 254 U.S., at 511, has a venerable history in our case law. [...] Yet the Court has understood this fiction to rest on the notion that the owner who allows his property to become involved in an offense has been negligent.
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The more recent cases have expressly reserved the question whether the fiction [that the thing is primarily considered the offender] could be employed to forfeit the property of a truly innocent owner. See, e. g., Goldsmith-Grant Co., 254 U.S., at 512; Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S., at 689-690 (noting that forfeiture of a truly innocent owner's property would raise "serious constitutional questions").
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...Congress has chosen to tie forfeiture directly to the commission of drug offenses. Thus, under § 881(a)(4), a conveyance is forfeitable if it is used or intended for use to facilitate the transportation of controlled substances, their raw materials, or the equipment used to manufacture or distribute them. Under § 881(a)(7), real property is forfeitable if it is used or intended for use to facilitate the commission of a drug-related crime punishable by more than one year's imprisonment.
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