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Sentencing and Penalties Judicial discretion and mandatory minimums, drug conspiracy penalties and double jeopardy - all of these can be found in this section. Pages: ‹1› ‹2› ‹3› ‹4› ‹5› ‹6› ‹7› ‹8› ‹9› ‹10› ‹11› ‹12› ‹13›
The extraordinary severity of the imposed penalties and the troubling racial patterns of enforcement give rise to a special concern about the fairness of charging practices for crack offenses. Evidence tending to prove that black defendants charged with distribution of crack in the Central District of California are prosecuted in federal court, whereas members of other races charged with similar offenses are prosecuted in state court, warrants close scrutiny by the federal judges in that District. In my view, the District Judge, who has sat on both the federal and the state benches in Los Angeles, acted well within her discretion to call for the development of facts that would demonstrate what standards, if any, governed the choice of forum where similarly situated offenders are prosecuted.
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In sum, I agree with the Sentencing Commission that "[w]hile the exercise of discretion by prosecutors and investigators has an impact on sentences in almost all cases to some extent, because of the 100-to-1 quantity ratio and federal mandatory minimum penalties, discretionary decisions in cocaine cases often have dramatic effects." [United States Sentencing Commission,] Special Report [to Congress: Cocaine and Federal Sentencing Policy,] 138. The severity of the penalty heightens both the danger of arbitrary enforcement and the need for careful scrutiny of any colorable claim of discriminatory enforcement.
For this and other reasons, the Sentencing Commission in its Special Report to Congress "strongly recommend[ed] against a 100-to-1 quantity ratio." Special Report 198. The Commission shortly thereafter, by a 4-to-3 vote, amended the guidelines so as to equalize the treatment of crack and other forms of cocaine, and proposed modification of the statutory mandatory minimum penalties for crack offenses. See Statement of Commission Majority in Support of Recommended Changes in Cocaine and Federal Sentencing Policy (May 1, 1995). In October 1995, Congress overrode the Sentencing Commission's guideline amendments. See Pub. L. 104-38, 109 Stat. 334. Nevertheless, Congress at the same time directed the Commission to submit recommendations regarding changes to the statutory and guideline penalties for cocaine distribution, including specifically "revision of the drug quantity ratio of crack cocaine to powder cocaine." Section(s) 2(a). [...]
[A] mandatory 5-year sentence is prescribed for distribution of 500 grams of cocaine or 5 grams of crack. [...] Simple possession of 5 grams of crack also produces a mandatory 5-year sentence. The maximum sentence for possession of any quantity of other drugs is one year...
With one prior felony drug offense, the sentence for distribution of 50 grams of crack is a mandatory 20 years to life. [...] With two prior felony drug offenses, the sentence is a mandatory life term without parole. [Under the sentencing scheme of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 and subsequent legislation.] [...]
The CCE statute's breadth [...] argues against treating each individual violation as a means, for that breadth aggravates the dangers of unfairness that doing so would risk. [...] The statute's word "violations" covers many different kinds of behavior of varying degrees of seriousness. The two chapters of the Federal Criminal Code setting forth drug crimes contain approximately 90 numbered sections, many of which proscribe various acts that may be alleged as "violations" for purposes of the series requirement in the statute. Compare, e.g., 21 U.S.C. §§ 842(a)(4) and (c) (1994 ed. and Supp. III) (providing civil penalties for removing drug labels) and 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (Supp. III) (simple possession of a controlled substance) with 21 U.S.C. § 858 (endangering human life while manufacturing a controlled substance in violation of the drug laws) and § 841(b)(1)(A) (possession with intent to distribute large quantities of drugs). At the same time, the Government in a CCE case may well seek to prove that a defendant, charged as a drug kingpin, has been involved in numerous underlying violations. The first of these considerations increases the likelihood that treating violations simply as alternative means, by permitting a jury to avoid discussion of the specific factual details of each violation, will cover-up wide disagreement among the jurors about just what the defendant did, or did not, do. The second consideration significantly aggravates the risk (present at least to a small degree whenever multiple means are at issue) that jurors, unless required to focus upon specific factual detail, will fail to do so, simply concluding from testimony, say, of bad reputation, that where there is smoke there must be fire.
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The Government, emphasizing the words "continuing series," says that the statute, in seeking to punish drug kingpins, focuses upon the drug business, not upon the particular violations that constitute the business. [...] The argument, however, begs the question. Linguistically speaking, the statute punishes those kingpins who are involved in a "continuing series of violations" of the drug laws. And Congress might well have intended a jury to focus upon individual violations in order to assure guilt of the serious crime the statute creates. Emphasizing the first two words in the passage does not eliminate the last.
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