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Sentencing and Penalties Judicial discretion and mandatory minimums, drug conspiracy penalties and double jeopardy - all of these can be found in this section. Pages: ‹1› ‹2› ‹3› ‹4› ‹5› ‹6› ‹7› ‹8› ‹9› ‹10› ‹11› ‹12› ‹13›
Under the laws of many other States, the maximum penalty McArthur would have faced for possession of 2.3 grams of marijuana would have been less than what he faced in Illinois. See, e. g., Cal. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 11357(b) (West 1991) ($ 100 fine); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-18-406(1) (1999) ($ 100 fine); Minn. Stat. § 152.027(4) (2000) ($ 200 fine and drug education); Miss. Code Ann. § 41-29-139(c)(2)(A) (Supp. 1999) ($ 100-$ 250 fine); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-416(13) (1995) ($ 100 fine and drug education); N. M. Stat. Ann. § 30-31-23(B) (1997) ($ 50-$ 100 fine and 15 days in jail); N. Y. Penal Law § 221.05 (McKinney 2000) ($ 100 fine); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 475.992(4)(f) (Supp. 1998) ($ 100 fine).
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It is not "absurd" that a local housing authority may sometimes evict a tenant who had no knowledge of the drug-related activity. Such "no-fault" eviction is a common "incident of tenant responsibility under normal landlord-tenant law and practice." 56 Fed. Reg., at 51567. Strict liability maximizes deterrence and eases enforcement difficulties.
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And, of course, there is an obvious reason why Congress would have permitted local public housing authorities to conduct no-fault evictions: Regardless of knowledge, a tenant who "cannot control drug crime, or other criminal activities by a household member which threaten health or safety of other residents, is a threat to other residents and the project." 56 Fed. Reg., at 51567. With drugs leading to "murders, muggings, and other forms of violence against tenants," and to the "deterioration of the physical environment that requires substantial governmental expenditures," 42 U.S.C. § 11901(4) (1994 ed., Supp. V), it was reasonable for Congress to permit no-fault evictions in order to "provide public and other federally assisted low-income housing that is decent, safe, and free from illegal drugs," § 11901(1) (1994 ed.).
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[T]he question is not, as the United States would have it, whether forfeiture under §§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7) is civil or criminal, but rather whether it is punishment.
In considering this question, we are mindful of the fact that sanctions frequently serve more than one purpose. We need not exclude the possibility that a forfeiture serves remedial purposes to conclude that it is subject to the limitations of the Excessive Fines Clause. We, however, must determine that it can only be explained as serving in part to punish. [...] In sum, even though this Court has rejected the "innocence" of the owner as a common-law defense to forfeiture, it consistently has recognized that forfeiture serves, at least in part, to punish the owner. [...] We turn next to consider whether forfeitures under 21 U.S.C. §§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7) are properly considered punishment today. We find nothing in these provisions or their legislative history to contradict the historical understanding of forfeiture as punishment. [...]
The fiction "that the thing is primarily considered the offender," Goldsmith-Grant Co., 254 U.S., at 511, has a venerable history in our case law. [...] Yet the Court has understood this fiction to rest on the notion that the owner who allows his property to become involved in an offense has been negligent.
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