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Archive for July, 2007

How Does Prohibition Affect Drug Use?

Our current Prohibition isn’t very successful at stopping drug use, for many obvious and not-so-obvious reasons. However, in order to sharpen our focus on this issue it is helpful to list the social effects that prohibitionist policies have on drug use. Here we go:

  • Deterrence or the fear of legal sanctions
    This mostly concerns expected legal risks (Example: the likelihood of the punishment for the prohibited activity in the eyes of a typical Joe Public.)

  • Informal self and social controls
    (a) Morality or legitimacy; (Example: Many people won’t try drugs if the society considers drug use to be something shameful and despicable.)
    (b) Forbidden fruit effects; (Example: Teens rebelling against the authority might be tempted to try drugs simply because the mainstream tells them not to.)
    (c) Community norms; (Example: Very religious rural communities create an environment that is less conducive to drug use than, say, a large cosmopolitan urban area.)
    (d) Informal or extra-legal social sanctions. (Example: The fear of being ostracized or being labeled a drug addict by friends and neighbors.)

While the economic laws of supply and demand make sure that the prohibitionist action-based policies are bound to fail, the prohibitionist propaganda (that was so prevalent during the Bill Bennett years) that tries to frame drug use as a social and moral taboo can be more successful. If the society believes that drug use is immoral, any rational argument for or against it becomes pretty irrelevant. Notice how in the list above, every type of social control mechanism (except the forbidden fruit effect) would work towards hampering activities associated with drug use in a drug-intolerant society.

(One of the reasons) why marijuana is still illegal

This nation smokes far more pot than uses any other illicit drugs. For example, almost half (47.8%) of all high school seniors tried it, as compared with the next runner-up - all of hallucinogens, at 12%. Source: Monitoring the Future Study (2002). The numbers are similar for general population drug use - marijuana users represent an overwhelming share of drug users in general.

This information generally requires no specialized knowledge. Similarly, by now it has become apparent to the point of becoming common knowledge, that the dangers of marijuana smoking are seriously overstated, to say the least. Some even call marijuana “the safest therapeutic substance known to man.” Who?? None other than Administrative Judge Francis Young of the DEA in In The Matter Of MARIJUANA RESCHEDULING PETITION (Docket No. 86-22). It is very likely that even the most stalwart DEA officials don’t really believe in the dangerousness of marijuana.

So, how come it remains in Schedule I?

The answer lies in the first paragraph. Removing marijuana from the list of “evil” illicit drugs would substantially reduce this nation’s drug problem: without marijuana the number of drug users - other drug users - would drop significantly. A dramatically smaller drug problem wouldn’t justify tens of billions of dollars in funding that the DEA currently receives. Regardless of the objective pros and cons of marijuana use, the DEA will always oppose the rescheduling of marijuana simply because they want to retain their allowance.

In order to request an addition, deletion or a change in the schedule of the drug, one must petition the DEA. When a petition is received by the DEA, the agency begins its own investigation of the drug. Then, the investigation goes through some more motions, until the DEA Administrator reviews all available data and makes a final decision whether to propose that a drug be controlled and into which schedule it should be placed. I wonder how objective you would be in making a decision that has a potential to deprive you of a substantial majority of your budget?

On Legal Formalism

Legal Formalism is a doctrine that reflects the wishful thinking of many legal theorists that judges should apply law in a sort of mathematical fashion without any regard to “real-life” normative or policy issues. (I think, in this country, Langdell was the originator of the formalistic school of thought in jurisprudence.)

Anyway. Under the doctrine, the judges should not concern themselves with whether the law is good or bad, just or biased, sound or nonsensical - all those issues are for the legislatures to decide. The idea is that a law should yield an unequivocal decision regardless of the substantive nature of the underlying fact pattern. There are many proponents of this doctrine, as well as many opponents (I, personally, happen to belong to the opposing camp) - but this post is really not about the merits of legal formalism, but rather about Supreme Court Justices hiding behind it, whenever they chicken out of truly addressing the issue before them on its merits.

For example, in Gonzales v. Raich (2005), observe Justice Stevens resorting to legal formalism in ruling upon an issue that is clearly about the right of gravely ill persons to, legally (under the state law) receive their medicinal marijuana without harassment by federal agencies:

“The case is made difficult by respondents’ strong arguments that they will suffer irreparable harm because, despite a congressional finding to the contrary, marijuana does have valid therapeutic purposes. The question before us, however, is not whether it is wise to enforce the statute in these circumstances; rather, it is whether Congress’ power to regulate interstate markets for medicinal substances encompasses the portions of those markets that are supplied with drugs produced and consumed locally. Well-settled law controls our answer. The CSA is a valid exercise of federal power, even as applied to the troubling facts of this case.”

Hey, it’s just about the blind application of the Congress’ power to regulate interstate commerce, right? As a legal formalist would put it, clearly the Controlled Substances Act legitimately has that power - and that’s all that matters - how that power is applied is beyond the scope of the judiciary. Notice how under Justice Stevens’ approach, the “case is made difficult by respondents’ strong arguments” - meaning, how strong real-life arguments of real-life respondents interfere with his structurally sound, aseptic interpretation of the issues. Well, lets consult the dissenting opinion by Justice Thomas:

“On this traditional understanding of “commerce,” the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), 21 U.S.C. ยง 801 et seq., regulates a great deal of marijuana trafficking that is interstate and commercial in character. The CSA does not, however, criminalize only the interstate buying and selling of marijuana. Instead, it bans the entire market — intrastate or interstate, noncommercial or commercial — for marijuana. Respondents are correct that the CSA exceeds Congress’ commerce power as applied to their conduct, which is purely intrastate and noncommercial.”

Hmmm… Now we have two eminent legal minds, one ruling that the CSA is within the commerce clause’ power to regulate interstate commerce; another saying that it isn’t. Under the perfect conditions envisioned by the formalistic doctrine, it isn’t supposed to happen. Seems like either the Controlled Substances Act is deficient, the Justices understanding of the formalistic approach is lacking or Legal Formalism itself is faulty. It could be all three are correct. It doesn’t really matter - after all, hiding behind a questionable doctrine to duck important issues is a dubious tactic all in itself.