Posts RSS Comments RSS 41 Posts and 16 Comments till now

Archive for May, 2007

Drugs and Race: Are Our Drug Laws Biased?

“…why all the Jews seem to be the ones that are for liberalizing the regulations on marijuana?”

R. M. Nixon, the 37th President of the United States, The Halderman Diaries



Obviously, drugs and race or ethnicity are linked only insofar a particular drug is socially endemic to a particular racial or ethnic group. Different substances play an important religious role in different religions: Christians use alcohol, some American Indian tribes prefer peyote, Hindus often use marijuana derivatives, etc. Similarly, a drug that is marginal or even illegal in one country can have a widespread social use in another.

Because of the cultural association of various substances with different ethnic groups, drug laws often served as proxies for the true intent of those in charge - cracking down upon the unwanted minority. For example, the prohibition of coke in the Harrison Narcotics Tax Act of 1914 was fueled by the fears of “a cocaine-crazed Negro brain.” The 1937 Marihuana Tax Act was seen as the means for law enforcement to “deal with” Mexican communities in the border areas. The opium prohibition was initially directed against the Chinese - for example, in 1887 the Congress enacted a law prohibiting importation of opium by the Chinese, but not by Americans.

Of course, the current drug laws seem to be all about safety, accepted medical use, and potential for abuse (even though the power to schedule substances was taken away from medical authorities and given to the Attorney General in 1969). That’s all nice and good, except that some of our nation’s drug laws seem to have a greater impact on certain ethnic minorities. Okay, I’ll just come out and say it bluntly: our Drug Laws incarcerate a disproportionately large number of blacks. Some studies estimate that “[o]ne in three black men between the ages of 20 and 29 years old is under correctional supervision or control.” Source: Mauer, M. & Huling, T., Young Black Americans and the Criminal Justice System: Five Years Later (Washington DC: The Sentencing Project, 1995).

“According to the federal Household Survey, “most current illicit drug users are white. There were an estimated 9.9 million whites (72 percent of all users), 2.0 million blacks (15 percent), and 1.4 million Hispanics (10 percent) who were current illicit drug users in 1998.” And yet, blacks constitute 36.8% of those arrested for drug violations, over 42% of those in federal prisons for drug violations. African-Americans comprise almost 58% of those in state prisons for drug felonies; Hispanics account for 20.7%.”

Source: Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, National Household Survey on Drug Abuse: Summary Report 1998 (Rockville, MD: Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, 1999), p. 13; Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 1998 (Washington DC: US Department of Justice, August 1999), p. 343, Table 4.10, p. 435, Table 5.48, and p. 505, Table 6.52; Beck, Allen J., Ph.D. and Mumola, Christopher J., Bureau of Justice Statistics, Prisoners in 1998 (Washington DC: US Department of Justice, August 1999), p. 10, Table 16; Beck, Allen J., PhD, and Paige M. Harrison, US Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics (Washington, DC: US Dept. of Justice, August 2001), p. 11, Table 16.

There are plenty of reasons that account for such a disparity: improperly drafted sentencing regulations, social causes - poverty and drug abuse often go hand-in-hand, and even plain racism - “Among persons convicted of drug felonies in state courts, whites were less likely than African-Americans to be sent to prison. Thirty-three percent (33%) of convicted white defendants received a prison sentence, while 51% of African-American defendants received prison sentences.” Source: Durose, Matthew R., and Langan, Patrick A., Bureau of Justice Statistics, State Court Sentencing of Convicted Felons, 1998 Statistical Tables (Washington DC: US Department of Justice, December 2001), Table 25, available on the web at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/scsc98st.htm, last accessed December 21, 2001.. Whatever the reasons are, the stark reality is that our drug laws have a very tangible tinge of racial disparity. Can something be done about that in terms of a legal challenge? Stay tuned for the next post.

Dealing with Afghani Poppy the Nixon way

An article in USA Today called “A better way to deal with Afghanistan’s poppy crop (As heroin trade grows, a Nixon-era plan in Turkey provides a model)” talks about different ways of dealing with Afghanistan’s poppy crop, which is estimated to be the source of 90% of the world’s heroin supply. The article sensibly disfavors spraying the crops with herbicide, welcoming

“…pilot projects under which the morphine factories would be set up in Afghan villages and monitored by village elders and outside groups. The factories could provide employment and income for the villages - and plow some profits into alternative industries.”

(Like I wrote in one of the previous posts, unless you are willing to legalize the stuff, buy it from farmers at black market prices. Of course, it is a temporary solution, since farmers will be induced to grow more of the stuff since it is so lucrative and there is a ready buyer. But - I digress.)

The article generally gets the situation right; however, what really caught my attention was the comparison of the current initiatives to Nixon-era crusade against the Turkey opium. The article writes about

“…a program that largely eliminated heroin production in Turkey in the 1970s with the support of President Nixon and Congress.

Like the Bush administration in Afghanistan, Nixon at first insisted on spraying the poppy fields. But Turkish leaders refused because of a revolt from their farmers. The compromise included guaranteed markets for the morphine. Within a few years, Turkey was no longer the premier source for heroin.

Boy, they really got this one wrong. First of all, according to the CIA estimates, even before the Nixon campaign, Turkey produced only from 3 to 8 percent of the world’s illicit opium and nobody was sure what percentage of that, if any, reached the United States (most was destined for European markets). Secondly, the Nixon crusade against Turkish poppy was reflective of the “administration’s determination to achieve quickly some dramatic breakthrough on the opium front.” So, the Nixon quest was largely politically, not pragmatically motivated - Turkey was chosen because as a NATO member it was more susceptible to U.S. pressure, unlike, for example, India, Laos or Burma, all of which produced substantially more poppy than Turkey.

So, to summarize - the USA Today article correctly treats some of the issues behind Afghani poppy cultivation, but gets the history totally wrong by comparing current programs to Nixon’s misguided attempt to rack up election points. For a brief, but nevertheless informative and fascinating story about Nixon’s fight against Turkish poppy, see:

Agency of Fear: The War of the Poppies

- a short chapter in Edward Jay Epstein’s Agency of Fear: Opiates and Political Power in America.

“The traffic in drugs finances the works of terror”

I got reminded of this ubiquitous mantra that was all over TV a few years ago when I read the following:

“Profits from Afghanistan’s thriving poppy fields are increasingly flowing to Taliban fighters, leading U.S. and NATO officials to conclude that the counterinsurgency mission must now include stepped-up anti-drug efforts.”

Source: CNN: Poppy profits fuel Taliban

“The traffic in drugs finances the works of terror,” said George W. And - he is right. Trading in illicit drugs is a lucrative business, and, considering that drugs are a black market commodity, a logical choice for those who want to stay under the radar. The thing is, trading in any black market commodity is acceptable as a clandestine financing scheme.

It’s funny how the leading U.S. and NATO officials still readily conclude that stepping up anti-drug efforts will help combat drug profits. Do they really think that it will work this time? I actually know a way that will pull the financial rug out from under the Taliban: buy all of the Afghani poppy supply at current black market prices (I am pretty sure it’s gonna come out cheaper than waging another unsuccessful anti-drug campaign) or, better yet - legalize poppy. Removing illicit drugs from the black market economy will immediately financially undermine most, if not all, of terrorist networks, organized crime entities and cartels.

Not like that’s gonna happen in the foreseeable future. For now, it seems like the way to combat illicit drugs and terror link is by throwing more money and resources at massive interdiction campaigns that are doomed to fail right from the start, or by engaging in this sort of rhetoric:

“‘DEA’s Target America is the first exhibit that makes the connection between illegal drug trafficking and terrorism, leaving no doubt that drug abuse can not be viewed as a victimless crime.’ …. said Administrator Hutchinson.”

Source: DEA: DEA AND GIULIANI OPEN NATIONAL MUSEUM EXHIBIT ON DRUGS AND TERRORISM

Right. Lets place the blame for terrorism squarely upon the shoulders of a drug user/abuser/consumer. After all, (s)he should have known where the money that pay for drugs might go to. According to Hutchinson, that makes a poor drug user culpable. According to my old Torts hornbook, there might be a small problem with proximate causation in that scenario. I’ll side with my hornbook on this one, because otherwise I could be blamed for slavery in Africa, just because I drink my cocoa in the morning.

Back to crack sentencing

I already wrote about U.S. Sentencing Commission’s recommendation to reduce the disparity between cocaine powder and crack-cocaine minimum sentencing schemas. The Commission recommends lighter minimum sentences for crack - since, under the current statute, trafficking in crack-cocaine will result in substantially greater minimum sentence than trafficking in the equivalent amount of coke powder. The idea is that the offenders will now be punished equally for trafficking in equal amounts of the same substance.

Douglas A. Berman, a professor of law at the Ohio State University, thinks that it is an important development, legally speaking. Alex Coolman of the Drug Law Blog has a less legalese, albeit a more common-sense approach to the issue, pointing out that the proposed changes would have a virtually cosmetic impact on “roughly 70% of crack sentences will be reduced, on average, from just over 10 years to just under 9 years” (He actually got the numbers from a Professor Berman blog post).

Obviously, there are many ways to look at this development. My brain here is with Professor Berman, while my heart sides with Alex Coolman. The problem here is not disparate sentences meted out to crack and coke powder dealers, but the harsh excessiveness of the punitive solution itself. The Sentencing Commission has to operate within the framework of the punitive model supplied to us by Congress. Obviously, as Alex mentions in plain-speak, striving for equitable results in a system the facets of which are grossly inequitable to begin with won’t result in a profound change for the better. But, I suppose, a sensible thing at the moment would be abandoning a quest for fairer across-the-board general paradigms and working to make the existing system fairer one positive step at a time. Think about it: the Sentencing Commission could have eliminated the sentencing disparity by raising the penalties for cocaine powder trafficking, instead of lowering the penalties for crack.

How much should the jurors be told?

Ed Rosenthal, a long-time medical marijuana advocate, is brought to trial in the federal court in San Fransisco on charges of marijuana cultivation. This is his second trial for essentially the same offense: growing marijuana as an agent for the city of Oakland’s medical marijuana distribution program (just to remind the readers, California legalized medical marijuana in 1996).

During his first trial in 2003, he was convicted and sentenced to only one day in jail (which he had already served at the time). That verdict was thrown out by the federal appeals court because of jury misconduct. Probably because Ed Rosenthal is such a well-known and an outspoken public figure, or possibly because they want a precedent on the books, the federal prosecutors are pursuing the conviction, even though they acknowledged that he could not be jailed if convicted again.

The larger issue here is that, just like in the first trial, the information that Ed Rosenthal was growing marijuana for sick patients is being withheld from the jurors. From what I remember, the 2003 conviction culminated in the angry jurors holding a press-conference to apologize to Rosenthal for convicting him and expressing their outrage for being manipulated. In the present case,

“District Judge Charles Breyer told the jurors they were there to decide whether Rosenthal was guilty of growing marijuana, not to draw conclusions about why the government was prosecuting him. For his part, Assistant U.S. Attorney George Bevan described the case as a straightforward prosecution for marijuana cultivation.”

Source: San Fransisco Chronicle: Pot advocate’s new trial begins

Obviously, this is not a straightforward prosecution for marijuana cultivation. While social attitudes to recreational drug use might have remained the same, it seems like, at least in California, the public views therapeutic marijuana use in a favorable light. Not telling the jurors about the reason behind Rosenthal’s marijuana cultivation prods them to make a decision that they would not otherwise have made, as the previous attempt at prosecuting Rosenthal amply demonstrated. The evidence that marijuana cultivation was authorized by the city of Oakland for distribution to sick patients might be irrelevant under the federal Controlled Substances Act; however, it is very relevant to a group of Rosenthal’s peers who are called upon by the federal government to decide his guilt or innocence. As far as I know, the jury still has the power to acquit a defendant regardless of whether he technically broke the law or not. I guess, I can’t say it better than Wikipedia:

“Jury nullification refers to a rendering of a verdict by a trial jury, disagreeing with the instructions by the judge concerning what is the law, or whether such law is applicable to the case, taking into account all of the evidence presented. Although a jury’s refusal relates only to the particular case before it, if a pattern of such verdicts develops, it can have the practical effect of disabling the enforcement of that position on what is the law or how it should be applied. Juries are reluctant to render a verdict contrary to law, but a conflict may emerge between what judges and the public from whom juries are drawn hold the law to be. A succession of such verdicts may signal an unwillingness by the public to accept the law given them and may render it a “dead-letter” or bring about its repeal. The jury system was established because it was felt that a panel of citizens, drawn at random from the community, and serving for too short a time to be corrupted, would be more likely to render a just verdict than officials who may be unduly influenced. Jury nullification is a reminder that the right to trial by one’s peers affords the public an opportunity to take a dissenting view about the justness of a statute or official practices.” (Italics Added).

Source: Wikipedia: Jury Nullification

The federal prosecutors and Judge Breyer are undoubtedly aware of the very real possibility of the jury exercising its jury nullification right in this particular trial. Hence, they withheld the information from it, I suppose, on the grounds that the probative worth of such evidence is low considering that (a) it is irrelevant as far as the federal law is concerned, and (b) it might make jurors unduly sympathetic to the defendant and thus, render their reasonable doubts uhm… unreasonable. The irony here is that a reasonable person is likely to render a more equitable decision had he or she been presented with a full context behind Rosenthal’s marijuana cultivation. The fact that that decision would likely not be the one favorable to the government should not be dispositive in excluding the evidence.

Could Gonzales v. Raich have been decided differently?

In the previous post, I mentioned that Gonzales v. Raich (2005) (a case where the Supreme Court held that “Congress’ Commerce Clause authority includes the power to prohibit the local cultivation and use of marijuana in compliance with California law.”) could have been decided against the government based on the Commerce Clause alone. Well, here’s how:

The Gonzales Court’s decision that the Congress is authorized under the Commerce Clause to regulate purely local cultivation and use of marijuana is eerily reminiscent of Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). Here’s what the case was about:

“Roscoe Filburn was a farmer who produced wheat in excess of the amount permitted under the applicable production quota. He argued that, because the excess wheat was produced for his private consumption on his own farm, it never entered commerce at all, much less interstate commerce, and therefore was not a proper subject of federal regulation under the Commerce Clause.

[..]

The Court [...] held that Congress could regulate wholly intrastate, non-commercial activity if such activity, viewed in the aggregate, would have a substantial effect on interstate commerce, even if the individual effects are trivial.”

Source: Wikipedia: Wickard v. Filburn

The Gonzales Court used a similar line of reasoning to discuss the possible diversion of medical marijuana into illicit markets. The Court didn’t even bother assessing the evidence of the impact on illicit interstate marijuana trade by the possible diversion of locally grown medicinal pot. In his dissent, Justice Thomas touched exactly upon this issue:

But even assuming that States’ controls allow some seepage of medical marijuana into the illicit drug market, there is a multibillion-dollar interstate market for marijuana. [...] It is difficult to see how this vast market could be affected by diverted medical cannabis, let alone in a way that makes regulating intrastate medical marijuana obviously essential to controlling the interstate drug market.”

In Wickard v. Filburn, the Commerce Clause allowed federal governments to regulate locally-grown wheat because of the possible substantial aggregate effect on the interstate commerce by hundreds of thousands of farmers growing wheat intrastate. However, the potential aggregate effect of diverting all of medicinal marijuana into illicit channels would barely make a splash in the huge river of interstate marijuana trade. Thus, because of the negligible effect of locally-grown medicinal marijuana on interstate commerce, “the CSA [the Controlled Substances Act] exceeds Congress’ commerce power as applied to their conduct, which is purely intrastate and noncommercial.” Gonzales v. Raich (2005) (Justice Thomas, dissenting). Uhm… I mean, could have exceeded if Gonzales v. Raich had been decided differently.

No judicial relief for medical marijuana

“Oakland medical marijuana patient and activist Angel Raich dropped her lawsuit against the federal government Thursday,” reports InsideBayArea.com.

Earlier in the decade, the Court delivered a one-two punch to the quest to quell the federal persecution of medicinal marijuana patients and their providers with two cases, United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers Coop. (2001) and Gonzales v. Raich (2005). The Oakland Cannabis Buyers Corp. held that “there is no medical necessity exception to the Controlled Substances Act’s prohibitions on manufacturing and distributing marijuana,” but declined to consider the constitutional issues. Justice Thomas, writing for the majority stated that:

“[T]he Cooperative asserts that, shorn of a medical necessity defense, the statute exceeds Congress’ Commerce Clause powers, violates the substantive due process rights of patients, and offends the fundamental liberties of the people under the Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments. [...] [W]e [do not] consider the underlying constitutional issues today. Because the Court of Appeals did not address these claims, we decline to do so in the first instance.”

So, a few short years later, in Gonzales v. Raich, the Court got an opportunity to rule whether the federal laws banning local cultivation and use of marijuana violates the Commerce Clause. It sided with the government, holding that “Congress’ Commerce Clause authority includes the power to prohibit the local cultivation and use of marijuana in compliance with California law.” However, once again, the Court decided to consider only the issues squarely before it:

“Respondents also raise a substantive due process claim and seek to avail themselves of the medical necessity defense. These theories of relief were set forth in their complaint but were not reached by the Court of Appeals. We therefore do not address the question whether judicial relief is available to respondents on these alternative bases. We do note, however, the presence of another avenue of relief. As the Solicitor General confirmed during oral argument, the statute authorizes procedures for the reclassification of Schedule I drugs. But perhaps even more important than these legal avenues is the democratic process, in which the voices of voters allied with these respondents may one day be heard in the halls of Congress.”

It seemed like the Court was determined to dodge the larger moral issue of whether it is appropriate for the federal government to persecute very, very ill people for trying to make their lives a little more bearable. I fully understand the Court for taking the formalistic approach and that “sympathetic plaintiffs make bad law,” but this case could have been decided differently, even when limited in scope to the Commerce Clause (For how respondents could have prevailed in Gonzales v. Raich, see the next post).

Well, the quote above provided Angel Raich with a roadmap to other possible “theories of relief.” First, she continued her legal quest, but, after she lost in the 9th Circuit on due process grounds, she gave up, stating that “I’ve lost all faith in the judicial system.” She now plans to heed the suggestion of the Gonzales Court and take her battle from courts to Congress. By the way, a bill that would alleviate the threat of federal prosecution for medical marijuana patients in the 12 states that allow it was soundly defeated in the House of Representatives four times during the past four years, each time it was introduced.

What does it take to prove medicinal value?

According to the statute, the substances listed in Schedule I (Title 21, Volume 9, Section 1308.11 of the Code of Federal Regulations) have “no currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States.” 21 USC Sec. 812.

What exactly constitutes “accepted medical use in treatment in the United State” under the statute can be argued; however many people have already concluded that a bunch of substances that are currently placed in Schedule I actually do have medicinal value. There are not many people in this country who are not aware about the raging debate about medicinal properties of marijuana, and it is an open secret that plenty of oncologists across the country have been recommending it to their patients as treatment for nausea and vomiting resulting from chemotherapy. Indeed, that would likely satisfy Judge Young’s “significant minority of physicians” test in determining what constitutes “accepted medical use.” In The Matter Of MARIJUANA RESCHEDULING PETITION, US DoJ DEA, Docket No. 86-22 (overruled by the DEA Adminstrator).

But, I got distracted here.

There are actually other Schedule I substances that appear to have medicinal properties. One of them is psilocybin, an active ingredient in magic mushrooms and LSD that appears to help cluster headache sufferers. Fred Reed wrote an article about psilocybin being used as a treatment for cluster headaches, obviously by cluster headache sufferers themselves. The reason why it caught my attention is because way back in college, a friend of mine actually suffered from cluster headaches and cured himself with a low doze of “shrooms.” From what I know about cluster headaches, the condition is so painful that sufferers have been known to literally bang their heads against walls. A low dose of magic mushrooms or LSD (a dose that is not sufficient to induce hallucinogenic effects) is claimed to be effective in aborting the cluster headache episode that’s in progress and extending remission periods. In his article, Fred Reed asks:

“When a seriously painful medical condition is cured by an illegal substance, the cure being substantiated by premier researchers at as good a medical institution as exists, what do we do?”

Source: Washington Times: When the Law Can Be Painful

Well, here’s what is generally done:

“Proceedings to add, delete, or change the schedule of a drug or other substance may be initiated by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), or by petition from any interested party, including the manufacturer of a drug, a medical society or association, a pharmacy association, a public interest group concerned with drug abuse, a state or local government agency, or an individual citizen. When a petition is received by the DEA, the agency begins its own investigation of the drug.

The DEA also may begin an investigation of a drug at any time based upon information received from law enforcement laboratories, state and local law enforcement and regulatory agencies, or other sources of information.

Once the DEA has collected the necessary data, the DEA Administrator, by authority of the Attorney General, requests from HHS a scientific and medical evaluation and recommendation as to whether the drug or other substance should be controlled or removed from control. This request is sent to the Assistant Secretary of Health of HHS. Then, HHS solicits information from the Commissioner of the Food and Drug Administration and evaluations and recommendations from the National Institute on Drug Abuse and, on occasion, from the scientific and medical community at large. The Assistant Secretary, by authority of the Secretary, compiles the information and transmits back to the DEA a medical and scientific evaluation regarding the drug or other substance, a recommendation as to whether the drug should be controlled, and in what schedule it should be placed.

The medical and scientific evaluations are binding to the DEA with respect to scientific and medical matters. The recommendation on scheduling is binding only to the extent that if HHS recommends that the substance not be controlled, the DEA may not control the substance. (Italics Added).”

Source: Wikipedia: Controlled Substances Act

For example, a recently-approved study aiming to evaluate the efficacy of MDMA (Ecstasy) in treatment of post-traumatic stress disorder first had to get the FDA approval, then had to get approved by an Institutional Review Board (IRB) (because it involves research with human subjects) and, finally, had to obtain DEA approval, since it involves a Schedule I substance. If the study actually confirms therapeutic value of MDMA, would that mean that Ecstasy will be moved from Shedule I? I am not sure, but one article that I found suggests that it will:

“If Ecstasy proves to be an effective and safe treatment for post-traumatic stress disorder, therapists can sign legal prescriptions for the drug.”

Source: Wired: DEA Accedes to Ecstasy Test

Getting back to psilocybin, shrooms, LSD and cluster headaches, the good news is that a study of psilocybin and LSD in people with episodic cluster headaches is currently being developed. The bad news is that it will probably take years to clear all bureaucratic hurdles.

Generally, I believe that many substances currently listed in Schedule I have medicinal properties - albeit unknown to medical science in its current state. The dangers (or the perceived dangers) of these substances got them into Schedule I in the first place. It would be nice if the reports of possible medical benefits of these substances actually induced FDA, DEA and HHS to assume a more proactive stance in investigating these benefits. After all, the medical science would certainly benefit from having another tool added to to its arsenal of treatments.

An 83-year-old woman forced to smoke crack - part of an ingenious plot

An 83-year-old Florida woman was forced to smoke crack cocaine by her housemate, so that the latter could steal personal information to get a credit card in the old woman’s name. After successfully obtaining the credit card, the ingenious thief racked up more than $3,000 in charges before being arrested on April 28. She is charged with:

“[...] criminal use of personal identification, use of another person’s ID without permission and retail theft, according to jail records.
[...]

The sheriff’s office said more charges were pending…”

Source: CNN: Thief made woman, 83, smoke crack, police say

If the article is wholly true, the additional charges that are pending could include:

  • possession of a controlled substance;
  • distribution of a controlled substance;
  • battery (possibly aggravated, since either crack would be considered a “deadly weapon” or, in this context, involuntary crack smoking by an 83-year-old woman would be considered severe injury);
  • domestic violence (the article says the woman got the old lady to smoke crack at least twice);
  • elder abuse (if they have that in that jurisdiction - New York is currently trying to increase the penalties for elder abuse legislatively).

Some people really have a knack for complicating their lives. Had the crack “administrator” simply stole $3,000, she would be charged (under New York law) with larceny in the fourth, or possibly in the third degree. Instead, with one fell swoop, she has racked up an impressive criminal record.

In local news… two cents on Rockefeller Drug Laws

Gabriel Sayegh of the Drug Policy Alliance in New York City wrote a good article about attempts to reform the New York State’s Rockefeller Drug Laws. For those who don’t know - we have one of the most draconian set of drug laws in the country.

Mr. Sayegh writes about the special interests that actually stand in the way of reforming the laws that are considered unjust virtually by everybody on both sides of the fence separating the sides in the drugs laws reform debate:

“From 1817 to 1981, New York built 33 prisons. But from 1982 to 2000, New York built 38 more prisons — all of them upstate. The unprecedented prison boom was largely an economic development plan meant to ameliorate the job loss upstate. Rural, white communities were clamoring to build and staff prisons. The Rockefeller Drug Laws delivered the bodies with harsh mandatory-minimum sentences for low-level drug offenses.”

and,

” More than 76 percent of the state’s prison inmates come from New York City. The U.S. Census Bureau counts them as residents of the upstate prisons in which they’re incarcerated, not as residents of the communities from which they came.

Why does this matter? According to the Prison Policy Initiative, if prisoners were not counted as “residents,” seven upstate Senate districts would be 5 percent short of their required population size, and thus have to be redrawn. This means that senators in those districts — all of them Republicans — would lose their seats, causing Republicans to lose their slim Senate majority. Unsurprisingly, Senate Republicans remain staunch opponents of repealing the Rockefeller Drug Laws.”

And, by the way, speaking of the Rockefeller Drug Laws, read about the history of their enactment in Edward Jay Epstein’s Agency of Fear: Opiates and Political Power in America. It’s only one short chapter and here’s the direct link:

Agency of Fear: Chapter 2 - Nelson Rockefeller

“Shocking” doesn’t even begin to describe what you’ll learn.

Next »