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Authors ›› O'Connor
This case exemplifies the role of States as laboratories. The States' core police powers have always included authority to define criminal law and to protect the health, safety, and welfare of their citizens. [...] Exercising those powers, California (by ballot initiative and then by legislative codification) has come to its own conclusion about the difficult and sensitive question of whether marijuana should be available to relieve severe pain and suffering. Today the Court sanctions an application of the federal Controlled Substances Act that extinguishes that experiment, without any proof that the personal cultivation, possession, and use of marijuana for medicinal purposes, if economic activity in the first place, has a substantial effect on interstate commerce and is therefore an appropriate subject of federal regulation.
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Relying on Congress' abstract assertions, the Court has endorsed making it a federal crime to grow small amounts of marijuana in one's own home for one's own medicinal use. This overreaching stifles an express choice by some States, concerned for the lives and liberties of their people, to regulate medical marijuana differently. If I were a California citizen, I would not have voted for the medical marijuana ballot initiative; if I were a California legislator I would not have supported the Compassionate Use Act. But whatever the wisdom of California's experiment with medical marijuana, the federalism principles that have driven our Commerce Clause cases require that room for experiment be protected in this case. For these reasons I dissent.
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Petitioners [...] argue that the temporary scheduling statute is unconstitutional because it bars judicial review. [...]
We reject petitioners' argument. Although § 201(h)(6), 21 U. S. C. § 811(h)(6), states that a temporary scheduling order "is not subject to judicial review," another section of the Act plainly authorizes judicial review of a permanent scheduling order. See § 507, 21 U. S. C. § 877. Thus, the effect of § 201(h)(6) is merely to postpone legal challenges to a scheduling order for up to 18 months, until the administrative process has run its course. This is consistent with Congress' express desire to permit the Government to respond quickly to the appearance in the market of dangerous new drugs. [...]
The Government's interest in the property is substantial. Good's use of the property to commit a drug offense conveyed all right and title to the United States, although a judicial decree of forfeiture was necessary to perfect the Government's interest.
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The government may, of course, tax illegal activity. See, e. g., Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 44, 19 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 697 (1968). In fact, we have upheld, as within Congress' taxing authority, a $100 per ounce tax on marijuana. United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42, 44, 95 L. Ed. 47, 71 S. Ct. 108 (1950). But the power to tax illegal activity carries with it the danger that the legislature will use the tax to punish the participants for engaging in that activity. This is particularly true of taxes assessed on the possession of illegal drugs: Because most drug offenses involve the manufacture, possession, transportation, or distribution of controlled substances, the State might use a tax on possession to punish a participant in a drug crime twice for the same conduct.
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